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INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,1
primarily to shield municipal governments from monetary damage
awards for violations of antitrust laws. The statute was passed after
a rash of antitrust suits against municipalities that began in the mid1970's, causing federal courts to struggle with applying the state action exemption to local governmental units. The Act eliminates the

threat of treble damage awards against municipal governments, but
continues to allow injunctive relief.
This Article discusses the past, present, and future of municipal
antitrust liability, focusing on land use planning and zoning. Part II
reviews the-federal courts' application of the judicially-created state
action exemption to the antitrust laws. It also presents problems inherent in the doctrine, particularly as applied to municipal governments. Part III discusses state statutory shields against antitrust lia-

bility, the new federal law, and recent cases decided under the Act.
It also discusses the preemption rationale, an alternative judicial
form of analysis for municipal antitrust cases. Part IV advocates another solution to the problem-a federal statute granting complete

immunity from the antitrust laws to local governmental units.
II.
A.

ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO LAND USE PLANNING DECISIONS

Introduction

In 1984, the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers
(NIMLO) surveyed the recent antitrust suits against municipalities.
A summary 2 included ninety-nine lawsuits divided into fifteen
categories. The most frequently litigated issues involved cable television,$ solid waste collection and disposal," water and other utility
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. III 1985).
2. Summary of the Results of the N.I.M.L.O. Survey on Antitrust, Breakdown by Subject on Antitrust Suits against Municipalities and Damages Claimed
Where Available (1984) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
3. The award or restriction of cable television franchises is a very frequently litigated area. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1396 (1986); Catalina Cablevision
Assoc. v. City of Tucson, 745 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1984); Affiliated Capital Corp. v.
City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, reh'g granted, 714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 788 (1986); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis,
694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Carlson T.V. v. City of Marble, 612 F. Supp. 669 (D.
Minn. 1985); Capital City Cable v. District Cablevision, Inc., No. 84-3524 (D.D.C.
1985); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Mich. 1985);
Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership v. City of St. Paul, No. 3-83 Civ.
1228 (D. Minn. 1984); Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
4. For recent waste collection and disposal systems cases, see L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1985) (exclusive
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services, 5 hospital and ambulance services,6 airport, taxi, and other
franchise challenged); Tom Hudson & Assoc., Inc. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d
1370 (9th Cir. 1984) (municipal award of exclusive contract), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1028 (1985); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984)
(city monopolization of waste collection and disposal), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004
(1985); Central Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Solid Waste
Agency, 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983) (all solid waste to be brought to municipal
land fill), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Heille v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d
1134 (8th Cir. 1982) (municipality entered trash collection business); Ideal Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Provo City Corp., 605 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1985) (city denied immunity when ban on waste hauling did not meet state action requirements).
5. For examples of cases involving water, see Auton v. Dade City, 783 F.2d
1009 (1 Ith Cir. 1986) (challenge to ordinance prohibiting construction of private
water wells); LaSalle Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. County of DuPage, 777 F.2d 377
(7th Cir. 1985) (challenge to joint activity of municipalities), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 2892 (1986); Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th
Cir. 1981) (challenge to charge for hook-up fees in area previously serviced by another city); Shrader v. Horton, 626 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1980) (challenge to compulsory hook-up with municipal water system).
For examples of recent cases involving sewers, see Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (annexation required to tie into sewer system);
Vickery Manor Service Corp. v. Mundelein, 575 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. II. 1983)
(challenge to municipal sewer requirements for developer).
For examples of recent cases involving power, see Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 770 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1985) (challenge to municipal utility district operation), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 886 (1986); Rural Elec. Co. v. Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power Co., 762 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1985) (challenge to
nonexclusive franchise); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 497 F.
Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1980) (participation in lawsuit not anticompetitive), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981).
For examples of recent cases involving telephone services, see Capital Tel. Co.
v. New York Tel. Co., 750 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1984) (challenge to differences in
services and charges), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985); Capital Tel. Co. v. City
of Schenectady, 560 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (denial of franchise); Jackson
v. Taylor, 539 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1982) (challenge by prisoners against municipal jailor for price-fixing telephone services), affd, 713 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
6. For examples of recent cases involving ambulance service, see Springs
Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 745 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1984)
(free city ambulance service); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas
City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (exclusive franchise for ambulance service),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G & L Ambulance Serv., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 142 (D. Conn. 1985) (exclusive contract for ambulance services); Mercy Peninsula Ambulance, Inc. v. County of San Mateo, 592 F.
Supp. 956 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (refusal to certify paramedics), affd, 791 F.2d 755
(9th Cir. 1986).
For examples of recent cases involving health services, see Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984) (doctor's clinical privileges revoked), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Benson v, Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners,
673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (challenge to dental licensing law); Hospital Dev. and
Serv. Corp. v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 619 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (challenge to district's policies regarding indigent patients); Addino v. Genesee Valley
Medical Care, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (nonprofit corporation's
health insurance plan deemed private corporation; no immunity); Brazil v. Arkansas
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transportation services,' and land use planning decisions.8 Almost
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 593 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (challenge to activities of state board and private state dental association), affd, 759 F.2d 674 (8th
Cir. 1985); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (refusal to grant podiatrist hospital privileges), affd, 752 F.2d 647 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985). For a discussion of this issue, see Trail &
Kelly-Claybrook, Hospital Liability and the Staff Privileges Dilemma, 37 BAYLOR
L. REV. 315, 348-62 (1985).
7. For examples of recent cases involving airport services, see Independent
Taxicab Drivers' Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th
Cir. 1985) (exclusive franchise granted for airport transportation), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 231 (1985); Lorrie's Travel & Tours, Inc. v. SFO Airporter, Inc., 753 F.2d
790 (9th Cir. 1985) (grant of exclusive airport transportation contract); Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984) (grant of
exclusive currency exchange), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); Pueblo Aircraft
Servs., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982) (operation of airport
concession); Greyhound Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380 (1 Ith
Cir. 1982) (denial of license to operate airport rent-a-car facility), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); Wellwoods Dev. Co. v. City of Aurora, 631 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
Il1. 1986) (competition for fixed-base operators); Transport Limousine v. Port
Auth., 571 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (limousine operator's challenge to a percentage fee); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 712 (D. Hawaii 1983) (exclusive contract for taxi services); Hill Aircraft &
Leasing Corp. v. Fulton Co., 561 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (challenge to airport authority's allocation of space), affd, 729 F.2d 1467 (11 th Cir. 1984); All Am.
Cab Co. v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Auth., 547 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn.
1982) (monopolization of airport ground transportation), affd, 723 F.2d 908 (6th
Cir. 1983).
For examples of recent cases involving taxicab and other transportation services, see Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d 1430 (9th
Cir. 1984) (franchise and fare regulation of city's taxi services), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1003 (1985); City of North Olmstead v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Auth., 722 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1983) (transit authority absorbed municipal bus
lines), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229 (D.
Mass. 1980) (bus transportation contract award challenge).
8. For examples of recent cases involving land use planning, see Scott v.
City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984) (restriction of commercial development in outlying areas to promote urban renewal), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003
(1985); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983) (challenge to municipality's
refusal to vacate platted streets without concessions from developer); Westborough
Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982) (developer's
challenge to city's rezoning in favor of competitor), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983); Miracle Mile Assoc. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (challenge to city's efforts to require developer's compliance with state and federal environmental legislation); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 587 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (12
year water moratorium restricting further expansion approved); Brontel Ltd. v. City
of New York, 571 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (city exempted city-owned property from rent control), affd, 742 F.2d 1439, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984);
Jonnet Dev. Corp. v. Caliguiri, 558 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (allegation of
conspiracy to monopolize urban hotel business when city purchased building for
subsequent reconveyance to third party); Ossler v. Village of Norridge, 557 F. Supp.
219 (N.D. I11.1983) (refusal to rezone and increase development potential); Mason
City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979)
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every state or municipal activity, however, has been challenged. 9
The NIMLO survey reveals the severity of the threat of antitrust lawsuits faced by municipalities prior to the Local Government
Antitrust Act. 10 The survey cites examples of damage figures sought
and/or awarded in several of the cases. For example, a cable televi-

sion company sued both a competitor and a municipality, challeng,
ing the award of an exclusive franchise to the competitor and seek-

ing $280 million in damages. 1 Another cable company claimed $255
million in damages against the City of Los Angeles, the mayor, and
various city officials for their refusal to award a franchise." In

Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau3 the original damage

claim was for $180 million. Likewise, in Richmond Hilton v. City of
Richmond, 4 the claim was for $260 million. Both suits involved alleged anticompetitive uses of the zoning power. Although most cases

in this area were filed in the federal courts, a few cases have been
(challenge to refusal to rezone property to permit regional shopping center), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
9. See, e.g., Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1985) (attorney
disciplinary proceeding); Riverview Inv., Inc. v. Ottowa Community Improvement
Corp., 774 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1985) (refusal to issue industrial revenue bonds);
Garcia v. Colorado State Bd. of Law Examiners, 760 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.) (grading
of bar exam), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 163 (1985); First Am. Title Co. v. South
Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983) (state agency regulations
on abstracting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing
Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992 (3rd Cir.) (racing commission establishing jockey pay), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1982); Cine 42nd St. Theatre Corp. v. Nederlander Org.,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (particular companies designated as developers for Times Square area); Parks v. Donrey, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 347 (W.D. Ark.
1984) (sign ordinance restricting outdoor advertising); Limeco, Inc. v. Division of
Lime, 571 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Miss. 1983) (lime business of the state), affd, 778
F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1985).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.
II. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. Jefferson City, 589 F. Supp. 85
(1984).
12. Universal Cable v. City of Los Angeles, No. 82-5202 (C.D. Cal. filed
Oct. 6, 1982).
13. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
14. C.A. No. 81-11 OOR (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d
1086 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Campbell v. City of Chicago, 639 F. Supp. 1501
(N.D. 111.1986) (state action immunity denied, $18 million claim); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (state action immunity
denied, $9 million claim); Coral Ridge v. City of Margate, No. 83-6267 (S.D. Fla.
filed 1983) ($30 million claim); D.E.S. Waste Control v. City of Carrollton, No.
C82-10-N (N.D. Ga. filed 1982) ($1 million claim); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County
of Lake, No. 81-C3160 (N.D. Ill. filed 1983) (state action exemption denied, $15
million claim); Asher v. City of Doniphan, No. 582-0097C (E.D. Mo. filed 1982)
($800,000 claim).
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heard in the state courts, 15 particularly liquor control cases.

6

This section focuses on antitrust challenges to land use planning
and zoning. These municipal activities are well suited to a discussion
of the applicability of antitrust laws in the governmental arena. This
is true because when a city, town, or county engages in land use
planning it is not acting as a business or a commercial enterprise,
but theoretically is engaging in traditional local government activities-promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Also,
land use planning,
arguably, is handled best at the local, not the
7
state, level.'
B.

The State Action Exemption

1. The Parker Doctrine
In 1890, the federal government passed the Sherman Act,18 its
first effort to preserve business competition. The Sherman Act pro-

hibited contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade, 19 as well as monopolies and attempts to monopolize.2

It also

authorized treble damages for violation of its provisions. 2 ' The Sherman Act contains no internal exceptions for municipalities, since the
primary goal of the Act was to prohibit restraint of trade in inter-

state commerce.22 The reach of the Sherman Act, like all federal

statutes, was limited by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution.3 In 1890, the
15. The best known state court case is Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d
644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). The
Fisher case is discussed infra notes 242-77 and accompanying text. For other state
court cases, see Benson & Gold Chevrolet, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 403 So. 2d 13 (La. 1981) (automobile commission's activities); Kartell v.
Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 384 Mass. 409, 425 N.E.2d 313 (1981) (nonprofit
medical services corporation not immune to antitrust challenge); George W.
Cochran Co. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 292 Md. 3, 437 A.2d 194 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Taylor Drug Stores, Inc.,
635 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1982); M.H. Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 386 Mass. 64, 434 N.E.2d 986 (1982); Intercontinental Packaging
Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1984).
17. See infra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
18. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 stat. 209 (1890) (currently codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
20. Id. § 2 (1982).
21. The treble damage provision of the Sherman Act was later superseded
by § 4 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 stat. 730 (1914) (currently codified in part as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985)).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 in pertinent part grants Congress the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."
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judiciary narrowly interpreted the scope of the commerce clause. 4
Courts generally held that interstate commerce meant, almost liter-

ally, a crossing of state lines. 5

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal commerce
power gradually expanded until it decided Wickard v. Filburn.26 In
Wickard, the Court held that certain completely intrastate activities
could be regulated by the federal government if their combined economic effects could affect interstate commerce. Until the Supreme

Court decided Wickard, any exemption for local municipal activity
would have been deemed unnecessary. Almost by definition, most
actions by local governments do not have interstate impacts. Many
local regulations, however, do affect interstate commerce. In Parker
v. Brown,2 8 decided the next year, the Court first pronounced a doc24. Hovenkamp & McKerron, Municipal Regulation and FederalAntitrust
Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 723-24 (1985). The authors argue that under the
then commonly accepted interpretation of the commerce clause such an exemption
would have seemed incomprehensible to legislators and judges alike. For example, in
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Supreme Court held that
the antitrust laws did not apply to manufacturing combinations absent a direct connection to interstate commerce. Only a few years later, the Court expanded this
very strict application of the interstate commerce requirement, at least in the antitrust area. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), the Court found
that price-fixing by meat dealers in their bidding on cattle directly impacted commerce, even though the bidding took place in one state.
The court gradually evolved from an interpretation that limited the commerce
clause in terms of the tenth amendment and that applied artificial tests (direct versus indirect impact on commerce or manufacturing versus commerce activity) to an
interpretation that emphasized the economic consequences of regulation. For a discussion of the development of the federal commerce power, see J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA

& J.N.

YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

146-67 (2d ed. 1983).

25. Compare Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (upholding
constitutionality of White Slave Traffic Act, which prohibited interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes); and Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)
(upholding federal regulation of interstate transportation of lottery tickets) with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage law for
women); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking child labor law restricting interstate transportation of goods produced by factories in violation of law);
and Illinois Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906) (striking federal regulation concerning quarantine of diseased animals).
26. 317 U.S. I1l (1942). In Wickard, the Court held that a farmer who
grew wheat for his household and farm use only was subject to federal quotas on
wheat production. The Court reasoned that although each individual farmer's crop
may have had only a minimal effect on interstate commerce, when taken in the
aggregate, the impact on the price of wheat nationwide would be "far from trivial."
Id. at 128.
27. Id. at 125.
28. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In the Parkercase, the State of California set up a
scheme to control the production, price, and marketing of raisins. California produced half the world's supply of raisins, most of which were consumed in the United
States. Interstate commerce clearly was affected by California's activities, but the
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trine commonly known as the "state action exemption," which stands

for the proposition that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit
individual, not state, action.2 9 Thus, the Sherman Act did not restrain a state, its officers, or agents from undertaking activities di-

rected by its legislature.3 0 Although the doctrine has been the subject of numerous cases and articles in recent years, the Supreme

Court did not elaborate on the state action exemption and its requirements for more than thirty years after deciding Parker.3 '
2. Application of the Doctrine

a. Supreme Court Cases
As early as 1951, the Supreme Court distinguished state action
from private action that was merely enforced by the state. In
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,32 the Court struck

down a Louisiana statute that permitted a distributor and retailer to
contractually fix a resale price that could also bind nonparties to the

contract. A retailer who knowingly sold goods below the price stipulated in a contract was guilty of unfair competition. The Court found
that this statute did not constitute state action because the prices
were set by private parties and merely were enforced through the
3
state mechanisms.

3

More than twenty years later, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State

Bar,34 the Court reached a similar result. The Goldfarbs unsuccessfully sought an attorney to perform a title examination for a fee below that published on the county bar minimum fee schedule. The
Court found that publishing a minimum fee schedule constituted

Court found that the state regulation coincided with federal antitrust policy. P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 115-16 (2d ed. 1974).
29. 317 U.S. at 351.
30. Id. at 352. The Court stated that the Sherman Act "must be taken to be
a prohibition of individual and not state action .

. ..

The state itself exercises its

legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing conditions of its
application." Id.
31. Comment, Antitrust Liability for Municipal Action and Concerted Attempts by Businessmen to Influence Such Action: Separate but Unequal-An
Anomaly Persists,88 DICK. L. REV. 697, 705 (1984). As that Comment points out,
the Court denied certiorari in several cases in which the state action issue was
presented. Id. at 703 n.50 (citing Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse
Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966)). The Comment
also notes that when Parkerwas decided, only two law reviews even mentioned the
case, and then only in their "Recent Decisions" sections. See id. at 701 n.33.
32. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
33. Id. at 389.
34. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).

1987]

MUNICIPAL LAND USE PLANNING

price fixing and was not required by the state acting as a sovereign
because no Virginia statute regulated fees. 35 The Court rejected the
argument that the fee schedule was prompted by ethical codes
promulgated with statutory authority by the Virginia Supreme Court
and was thus required by the state. 6 The fact that the state bar was
a state agency for limited purposes provided 37no shield for what the
Court deemed an essentially private activity.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 the Court reiterated this
public-private distinction. In Cantor, a private utility regulated by
the Michigan Public Service Commission allowed residential customers to exchange free light bulbs for burned-out bulbs. This exchange
program was incorporated into tariff rates that were approved by the
Commission and that required Commission approval for revision.
The Court found that the state action exemption was not available to
the utility because the utility controlled the option to conduct the
program.3 9 The Court also held that no inherent inconsistency existed between the federal antitrust laws and the regulations involved
in Cantor. °
In contrast, the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona41 found
2 exemption encompassed a restriction on lawyer
that the Parker4
advertising imposed by the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court distinguished Goldfarb," stating that the restriction was compelled by the
state acting as a sovereign. 4" The Bates Court also distinguished
Cantor5 noting that because the claim in Bates was against the state
itself, rather than against a private party as in Cantor, the state had
an actual interest in the regulation that was essential to its regulatory scheme. 46 The Bates Court also clarified the test for state action
immunity by requiring that the regulation clearly articluate an ex35. Id. at 790.
36. Id. at 791.
37. Id. at 791-92.
38. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
39. Id. at 594. The Court stated: "There is nothing unjust in a conclusion
that respondent's participation in the decision is sufficiently significant to require
that its conduct implementing the decision, like comparable conduct by unregulated
businesses, conform to applicable federal law." Id. The Court further noted that this
conclusion was not inconsistent with the rationale underlying Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), because in Parker the state required all raisin producers in the

state to comply with the proration program. By contrast, Michigan never required
any utility to comply with a light bulb exchange program. 428 U.S. at 594 n.32.
40. 428 U.S. at 595-96.
41. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
42. 317 U.S. 341.
43. 421 U.S. 773.
44. 433 U.S. at 360.
45. 428 U.S. 579.
46. 433 U.S. at 361.
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press state policy, be subject to pointed reexamination by the policy
maker and active state supervision.4"
Similarly, in New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin
W. Fox Co.,48 the Court upheld a statute requiring an automobile
manufacturer to obtain board approval to open a new retail motor
vehicle dealership if any existing local franchise protested the establishment of a competing dealership. Again, the Court found a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed policy to replace some competition with regulation. 9 The Court found that some
inconsistency
50
with federal policy did not render the law invalid.
In 1978, the Court examined municipal rather than state antitrust51 liability. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., a plurality held that a city was a person under the antitrust
laws and that local governments were not entitled to automatic exclusion. 52 Four justices would have exempted cities from the Sherman Act only when anticompetitive conduct was directed or authorized and supervised by the state as part of its clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed policy to substitute regulation for competition.53 Chief Justice Burger, concurring with the result, would have
required the state to compel the anticompetitive activity and the cities to show that the regulation was essential to its regulatory scheme.
Because he viewed the city as acting as a municipal utility, not as a
governmental body, no state action immunity was available. 4 Four
justices dissented, arguing that cities should be immune from antitrust liability in the exercise of a governmental function. 55 Significantly, however, the Supreme Court recently rejected the use of integral, necessary, or traditional governmental functions as a test for
distinguishing state immunity from federal regulation. In Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,56 the Court stated
that such57a rule was "unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice.
47.

Id. at 362.

48. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
49. Id. at 109.
50. Id. at I10.

51.

435 U.S. 389 (1977).

52. Id. at 397, 413.
53. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens comprised the plurality,
Id. at 413.
54. Id. at 424-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
55. Id. at 426, 429-30 (Stewart, White, Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that municipal governments were state instrumentalities whose actions constituted exercise of the state's sovereign power. "City governments ...

are thus a far cry from the private accumulations of wealth that the

Sherman Act was intended to regulate." Id. at 429-30.
56. 469 U.S. 528, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985).
57. Id. at 546.
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In California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,5 8 the Court, relying on prior case law, established a twopart test for state action antitrust immunity under Parker.The regulation must be a part of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state . . . policy" and must be "actively supervised by the
state."5 9 In Midcal, the Court found that a state-regulated resale
price maintenance agreement on wine met the first prong of the test,
but not the second. 60
Midcal was similar to Schwegmann Bros.6 The state in Midcal
merely authorized the price setting and enforced the prices established by private parties.6 2 The Court stated that "[t]he national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a
gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price fixing arrangement." 6 3 In Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 4 the Court concluded that the state constitutional
grant of home rule power to a municipality was insufficient to immunize the municipality from antitrust liability under the MidcalParker doctrine. 65 In Boulder, the city enacted a three month moratorium on cable television hook-ups by the plaintiff to enable the city
council to draft a model cable television ordinance and to attract
new cable companies to the area."6 The city claimed that the state of
Colorado vested the municipality with all of the state's sovereign
powers in local and municipal affairs via the home rule powers. The
Court held that despite the home rule statute the state had no
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy with regard to the moratorium.67 To the contrary, the state assumed a neutral position on the issue.68 The dissent argued that the Court's decision effectively destroyed not only the municipalities' power to
regulate the local economy, but also the home rule movement in the
United States today. Rehnquist's dissent also contended that the
Court's decision radically alters the relationship between the states
and their political subdivisions by requiring home rule units to seek
the imprimatur and approval of the state for many decisions affect58. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
59. Id. at 105 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (1978)).
60. Id. The state failed to meet the second-prong because it merely author-

ized price setting without setting prices or reviewing the reasonableness of set prices.
61.

341 U.S. 384 (discussed supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text).

62. 445 U.S. at 105.
63. Id. at 106.
64. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

54-56.
45-46.
53.
55.
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ing only matters of local concern.69
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has found state or local
governments to be immune from the antitrust law. In Hoover v.

Ronwin,7 0 the Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court acted in a
legislative capacity in determining a grading formula for bar admissions and that state-enacted
legislative actions are ipso facto exempt
71
from the antitrust laws.
In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,7 2 the Supreme Court

eliminated the active state supervision requirement for exemption
from the antitrust laws when the actor is a municipality. The Court

distinguished Midcal, indicating that state supervision is required

when private parties engage in the anticompetitive conduct. 73 However, because the dangers of anticompetitive conduct are deemed
lessened in the municipal action situation,7 4 the state supervision

prong is not necessary. Justice Powell's opinion for a unanimous
court noted that once state authorization exists, the state need not
actively supervise "the municipality's execution of what is a properly
delegated function. 17 5 On the issue of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, the Court held that Wisconsin

statutes, which grant authority to cities to construct and maintain
sewer systems, to delimit service areas and to refuse to serve unannexed areas, sufficiently reflected a state policy to displace competi-

tion with regulation.7 6 The Court indicated that cities need not be

compelled to act by the state and that the state need not expressly
indicate that its delegation
to municipalities is intended to have an77
ticompetitive effects.
69. Id. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
71. Id. at 579-80. "When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself. . . the
danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise. Where the conduct in issue
is in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court, we need not address the
issues of 'clear articulation' and 'active supervision.'" Id. at 569.
72. 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
73. Id. at 39-40 & n.3.
74. The Court stated: "We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary,
that the municipality acts in the public interest." Id. at 45 (footnote omitted). The
Court added: "Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to
be exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct." Id. n.9.
75. Id. at 47. The Court contrasted the Wisconsin statute with the type of
home rule statute in Boulder, 455 U.S. 40. Although the statute in Boulder allowed
the city to decide every aspect of its cable television policy, the Wisconsin statute
specifically authorized the "cities to provide sewerage services and has delegated to
the cities the express authority to take action that forseeably will result in anticompetitive effects." 471 U.S. at 43.
76. 471 U.S. at 44.
77. Id. at 44-46. In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985), decided the same day as Town of Hallie, 471
U.S. 34, the Court found that both prongs of the Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, test were
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Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. City of
Berkeley.78 In Fisher, the Court found that the city's rent control
ordinance was not preempted by the Sherman Act and thus was

constitutional. 9

Recently, state action exemption requirements appear somewhat
relaxed when compared to the Midcal80 requirements of state authorization and supervision. The Hoover"l case illustrates that a
state government is ipso facto exempt from antitrust scrutiny when

acting in a legislative capacity. Yet, to claim immunity from the antitrust laws, a municipality still must show state authorization or a
state policy to displace competition with regulation. This state policy, however, need not compel the anticompetitive activity or expressly indicate an anticompetitive intent or goal. 82 After Town of
Hallie,8 3 state supervision of an authorized local activity is no longer

required. s4

Currently, the state action doctrine does not help determine
whether a state policy to displace competition with regulation exists,
satisfied when motor common carriers were authorized by state law to submit collective rate proposals to the public service commissions of their respective states.
The Court overruled the Fifth Circuit by holding Midcal applicable to private party
defendants, and that the anticompetitive activity need only be permitted rather than
compelled under state law when the private parties are regulated. 471 U.S. at 5960, 61-62. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, dissented, arguing that the
Court's decision was inconsistent with the policies of the Sherman Act and with
prior Court decisions. Id. at 66-80. Stevens cited as examples: Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-93, 597 (state involvement in restrictive private activities yields no antitrust immunity) (Stewart, Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting;
state action exemption requires private conduct to be "compelled," not merely
"prompted" by state action); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791
(1975) (anticompetitive conduct "prompted" by state action not sufficient; such
conduct must be required by state acting as sovereign); United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1949) (only Congress can write
exceptions into Act); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945)
(regulated industries not automatically exempt from Sherman Act).
Justice Stevens noted that in Cantor the Court was divided on whether compulsion alone was sufficient to confer antitrust immunity. 471 U.S. at 72. He also cited
statutes that exempt certain rate-making activities from the antitrust laws. Id. at
77, 79. Stevens argued: "Only Congress, expressly or by implication may authorize
price-fixing and has done so in particular industries or under compelling circumstances." Id. at 67.
78. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
79. Id. at 1051. For discussion of the Fishercase, see infra notes 242-77 and
accompanying text.
80. 445 U.S. 97.
81. 466 U.S. 558.
82. For discussion of Town of Hallie, see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
83. 471 U.S. 34.
84. Id. at 47.
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particularly when an express indication of any anticompetitive goals
is not required. Many of the lower court cases discussed in the next
section illustrate this problem. The courts struggle with the implied
powers to restrict competition granted to local governing bodies by
their state legislatures via statute.
Another conceptual problem with the courts' present approach
is the apparent extreme deference granted to state legislature decisions and the complete lack- of deference to more localized decisionmaking. This approach is inconsistent with Justice Powell's unanimously supported view in Town of Hallie,85 which presumes that a
municipality acts in the public interest.8 6 Additional problems inherent in the state action doctrine are discussed below.
b. Lower court decisions
In land use planning, federal courts generally have found municipal activities and decisions to be immune from liability under the
antitrust laws, particularly in the absence of specific allegations of
conspiracy or self-dealing by local officials. Such allegations are
often determinative of the threshold issue of immunity. Another important factor in determining immunity is the courts' perception of
anticomthe likelihood that state legislatures considered the possible
87
petitive effects of state-authorized municipal activities.
For example, in 1985 the Seventh Circuit granted immunity to
three local governmental units-two villages and a county--charged
with conspiracy regarding sewage service, water service, annexation,
and zoning. 88 The plaintiffs were potential developers of a luxury
housing development on a 143 acre tract. The municipalities allocated the area's water and sewage services between themselves and
the county, allegedly in a conspiracy. The municipalities then denied
the developers a special use permit for the proposed development. 89
The court found that the anticompetitive effects that resulted from
state zoning statutes authorizing these activities were foreseeable by
the state legislature.90
In a recent shopping center case, the Eighth Circuit found a
city's zoning ordinance that restricted outlying commercial development, and its contract with a private developer for a central city
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 45.
87. As the Supreme Court decisions instruct, the state legislatures need not
intend for the authorized municipal actions to have anticompetitive consequences.
See supra notes 28-86 and accompanying text.
88. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of DuPage, 777 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2892 (1986).
89. Id. at 379-80.
90. Id. at 381-85.
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redevelopment project, to be immune to an antitrust challenge. 91 The
plaintiffs owned land along the city's periphery that was zoned for
commercial development, upon which they proposed to build a regional shopping center. The city, however, later rezoned the property
to prohibit such development because of an existing downtown urban
renewal plan. The court found state authorization under a state urban renewal law and concluded that the state legislature must have
anticipated the potential anticompetitive economic impacts of the
statute.9 2
In Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 93 an Illinois federal judge
granted a defense motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The jury had awarded the plaintiffs $9.5 million, which amounted to
a $28.5 million judgment against the municipal defendants under the
treble damages provisions of the antitrust laws. 4 The plaintiffs filed
suit against a county, its board members, and a village, including its
trustees and mayor, alleging that the defendants conspired to prevent
the plaintiffs from developing land by denying them access to sewer
services and by invalid annexation and rezoning activities. 5 The
court granted the defendants' motion on alternative grounds, noting
that the municipal defendants' conduct was authorized and that anticompetitive consequences were foreseen by the state legislature.
Thus, the governmental conduct was protected from antitrust liability under the Parker doctrine. 98 Furthermore, the court found the
antitrust claim wanting because the plaintiffs failed to establish requisite relevant markets or injury to competition within those
97
markets.
A federal district court in Maryland recently found antitrust
immunity for the denial of a special use permit needed to construct a
91. Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
92. Id. at 1210-16. Similarly, in Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester,
617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that the city's actions were immune to
an antitrust challenge. Id. at 20. The city was building a downtown shopping center

and therefore opposed the construction of a shopping mall bordering the community.
The city petitioned the New York Department of Environmental Conservation and
the Army Corps of Engineers to restrict the development. The court held that the
city's activity was protected under the state action doctrine because the state and
federal agencies in question accepted jurisdiction and forced the complainant to
comply with their regulations. Id. at 20-21.
93. 631 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
94. Clayton Act ch. 323 § 4, 38 stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15

(Supp. III 1985)).
95. 631 F. Supp. at 185-87.
96. Id. at 191.
97. Id. at 191-96. A discussion of the merits of an antitrust claim in the
municipal area is relatively rare, as evidenced by the Unity Ventures court's failure
to cite cases based on challenges to municipal activity.
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filling station.98 The court, following Scott v. City of Sioux City,"9

predicted the Town of Hallie'0 0 rule that active state supervision is

not required to establish a state action exemption.10 1 The court also

found that the state zoning statute and Maryland court decisions re-

expressed state policy
flected a clearly articulated and affirmatively
02
to displace competition with regulation..
In Brontel Ltd. v. City of New York,10 3 a New York district
court found that the state action exemption encompassed the city's
rent control regulations.10 4 The state had enacted an emergency
housing rent control act authorizing the city to adopt and administer
appropriate ordinances.' 0 5 Therefore, the court found a state policy

to displace competition with regulation.

In Jonnett Development Corp. v. Caliguiri,0 6 a Pennsylvania

federal court granted summary judgment against a developer's allegations that the city of Pittsburgh conspired to prevent it from acquiring property on which it planned to construct a hotel. The court
found that the developer failed to establish two elements essential 0to7

an antitrust claim--conspiracy and illegal objective or conduct.

On the immunity issue, the court found that the city and its named
officials were exempt from antitrust liability under the state action
doctrine. 0 8 The court determined that the municipal defendants had
the power to plan the redevelopment area, including the location and
number of hotels. Because the Pennsylvania legislature enacted an

urban redevelopment statute authorizing the municipality to
purchase real property in blighted areas for redevelopment
98. Racetrack Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F. Supp. 892
(D. Md. 1985), affd, 786 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1986).
99. 736 F.2d 1207 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 88-90).
100. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
101. 601 F. Supp. at 903. The court also held, in the alternative, that state
court review of local zoning decisions would constitute sufficient state supervision.
Id. at 907-08.
102. Id. at 906-07. The court emphasized the state's statutory criteria for
zoning decisions, including public need, which was the expressed basis for the denial
in this case. Id. at 908.
103. 571 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984).
104. Id. at 1071.
105. Id. at 1071-72.
106. 558 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
107. Id at 966. The court cited Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler
Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978), as establishing the four essential elements to a cause of action under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. These elements include: 1) a conspiracy, 2) an anticompetitive impact on the
relevant product and geographical markets attributable to the conspiracy, 3) illegal
conduct and purpose of the conspiracy, and 4) the plaintiff's injury proximately
caused by the conspiracy. 558 F. Supp. at 966.
108. 558 F. Supp. at 965.
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purposes.10 9
When more specific allegations of self-dealing and conspiracy
are raised, however, courts are more likely to deny summary judgment on the issue of immunity or to find that the antitrust claims
should be tried on their merits. For example, in Westborough Mall,
0 the court found genuine issues of
Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,"1
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment on an alleged
antitrust violation. The plaintiffs alleged that the city deprived them
of their zoning rights and then improperly granted those rights to
another developer in contravention of state law and policy. The court
concluded that a conspiracy to thwart normal zoning procedures and
to deprive persons of their property was not encompassed by any
clearly articulated state policy."1 '
In another shopping center case, 112 the plaintiffs sought to develop a regional shopping center bordering the downtown area. They
sued the city and various individual defendants for conspiring with
developers of a downtown shopping center to discourage outlying development. The plaintiffs attributed their denial of a rezoning request to the alleged anticompetitive agreement. 1 3 The court found
that the allegations precluded summary judgment. The court, strictly
construing the state zoning statute, found that the statute did not
compel any zoning activity by the municipality and did not contemplate any anticompetitive conduct. 1 14 When the case was tried on the
merits, the jury denied relief to the plaintiffs and the result was affirmed on appeal." 5 This particular result may also be explained by
the tenor and the language of the Supreme Court cases in this area
at the time the case was heard. In 1979, courts strictly construed the
type of state authorization required, largely because of such Supreme Court decisions as City of Lafayette" 6 and Midcal,1 7 and
because of the Court's description of the state action test as requiring "a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy." 1 8
In Whitworth v. Perkins,'" the City of Impact, Texas author109. Id.
110. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1983).
111. Id. at 746.
112. Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737
(N.D. Iowa 1979), affd in part, revd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
113. Id. at 740.
114. Id. at 742-43.
115. 671 F.2d 1146.
116. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
117. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).

118. See, e.g., 435 U.S. at 413; 445 U.S. at 105. For a discussion of these
cases, see supra notes 51-55, 58-60 and accompanying text.
119. 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).

982
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ized the sale of alcoholic beverages, but later enacted an ordinance
prohibiting such sales on lots zoned for residential purposes. 120 Consequently, the plaintiff could not sell alcoholic beverages and filed an
antitrust suit. The appellate court, reversing the lower court's sum-

mary judgment for the defendants, distinguished Whitworth from
21
In Whitworth the challenged conduct was that of the city
Parker.1

and not the state. The program allegedly was enacted to further private and not public goals and was not adopted with federal assistance and cooperation.122 Because the actor was a municipality and
not the state itself, the court focused on whether the governmental

decision1 23was bona fide and not merely an action taken for private
benefit.

Other lower federal court cases reflect similar reasoning.

24

Ap-

120. Id. at 380.
121. Id. at 380-82.
122. Id. at 381-82.
123. Id.
124. In 1983, a South Carolina federal court found that the enactment of
certain ordinances regulating billboards did not automatically clothe a municipality
with immunity from antitrust liability. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444 (D.S.C. 1983). The complaint was
based on an alleged separate conspiracy between municipal officials and a major
local billboard company and not the existence of the ordinances themselves. Thus,
the court did not have to decide whether the South Carolina zoning statute authorized this activity or expressed a state policy regarding billboard regulation. Id. at
1446. The court distinguished an allegation that the city's action violated the antitrust laws from an allegation that the city conspired to violate the antitrust laws by
finding that, although the city's actions may be exempt from the antitrust laws,
conspiracy to violate such laws could render state action immunity unavailable.
The Omni court cited other cases is which courts reached the same conclusion.
Id. (Cedar-Riverside Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn.
1978), affd on other grounds sub nom., Cedar-Riverside Assoc., Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979); Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 198 11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980)).
In Stauffer, a Colorado federal court found that a town and various municipal
officials were not immune under the state action doctrine when the complaint alleged that a rezoning of the plaintiff's property sought to promote individual officials' self-interest. The municipality rezoned the plaintiff's property from multifamily to single family use. 1981-1 Trade Cas. at 76,327. The suit alleged that the
rezoning resulted from a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from competing for multifamily housing and to enhance the value of several municipal officials' property,
which was suitable and zoned for multifamily housing. Id. at 76,328. The court
found that the Colorado zoning statutes evidenced a policy "to displace competition
with regulation" and that adequate state supervision of this policy was established
by the statutes. Id. at 1 76,329-30. The promotion of individual economic benefit,
however, was not authorized by the statutes. Thus, the court denied summary judgment. Id. at 5 76,330.
In 1977, a Utah federal court found that a county and its employees were not
immune from antitrust liability when the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to decrease
competition in the real estate market. Nelson v. Utah County, 1978-1 Trade Cas.
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parently, the lower federal courts have employed either the test for
potential liability suggested by Deutsch or by Wiley. Deutsch would
recognize antitrust liability when local governments act as developers, as partners with developers, or when local officials act outside
their authority, succumbing to corruption, self-dealing, or improper
influence. 12 5 Wiley would expose local governments to antitrust liability when the challenged regulation resulted from private party influence rather than in response to a market problem.126 Both of these
tests explain the denial of summary judgment in cases of alleged
self-interest by municipal officials.
The cases discussed illustrate problems inherent in the judicially
created and interpreted state action doctrine. In factually similar situations, courts have frequently reached different results on the issue
of immunity. The determination of immunity is important because a
trial on the merits significantly increases the cost of such lawsuits to
the municipality, notwithstanding the Local Government Antitrust
Act, 27 under which injunctive relief is the only available remedy.
Furthermore, this threshold determination appears to turn on the
strength of the plaintiff's allegations of individual wrongdoing or
self-dealing by government officials.
The de facto approach of the courts, as explained by the
Deutsch and Wiley theories, is unsatisfactory for several reasons.
Criticisms of the application and analysis used in the state action
exemption doctrine are discussed in the next section.
3.

Criticisms of the Doctrine

a.

Problems of Analysis

As previously noted, the Parker decision generated little comment in 1943.128 Some classic criticisms of the Parker doc(CCH) 62,128 (D. Utah 1977). The plaintiffs alleged that a conspiracy between*
county officials and a private corporation caused the county to enact an invalid
zoning ordinance and to deny building permits to the plaintiffs. Id. at 74,967. The

court found that the Utah zoning statutes did not confer sufficient state authorization to automatically exempt the county and its officials from the antitrust laws
because the zoning statutes were merely discretionary. Id. at t 74,968.
125. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 222, 235-38 and accompanying text.
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. III 1985); see also infra notes 194-220 and
accompanying text.
128. Even recently, in referring to Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), one commentator noted:

This most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on municipal antitrust liability caused an initial ripple of concern that quickly subsided. The Ameri-

can Planning Association began conducting a series of workshops on land
use law in the early 1980's, and after a couple of years with a lecture on
antitrust in the workshop curriculum, it was eventually dropped because of

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:965

trine-state action exemption-note the expense of litigation and the

chilling or deterrent effect of the threat of antitrust suits on a municipality.1 29 Critics claim that cities and counties would hesitate or
refuse to legislate even though legislation might improve the public

health, safety, and welfare if threatened with antitrust litigation. 130
The federal solution to this problem, the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,131 does not eliminate the deterrent effect of the

antitrust laws because injunctive relief (and the tandem expense of
litigation) remains available. The Act does, however, alleviate mu-

damage awards, which could
nicipal concerns about large monetary
132
be trebled under the antitrust laws.

lack of interest, even after the Boulder decision. However, interest in the
issue was revived in 1984 because of recent developments in the case law
and federal statutes.

Merriman, Limiting Land Use Liability, in 1985

ZONING AND PLANNING LAW

§ 7.03(2)(b). For a discussion of recent decisions and statutes, see infra
notes 175-277 and accompanying text.
129. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 73-74 (1984); accord Civiletti, The
Fallout From Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospectsfor a
Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379, 385-87 (1983); Williamson, Commentary: The Reagan Administration's Position on Antitrust Liability of Municipalities, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 371, 377 (1983); Comment, State Action Immunity
for Local Land Use Decisions: Oregon and Washington Systems Provide Broad
Contrasts, 20 WILLAMETrE L.J. 755, 782 (1984).
130. Sterk criticizes the award of money damages in unconstitutional land use
regulation cases on a variety of grounds. Sterk, Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J. 113 (1983). The sections discussing the
efficiency aspects of monetary awards could apply to antitrust concerns as well:
"First, a blanket liability rule could provide a general incentive for government inaction because no comparable damage sanction would attach to a decision not to
act." Id. at 138. Sterk further noted:
[T]he threat of municipal damage liability for enactment of unconstitutional ordinances would probably cause municipal officials to engage in
more extensive evaluation of constitutional issues. However, because municipal officials are not, as a group, well-suited for constitutional decisionmaking, damage liability is likely to deter enactment of constitutional and
socially desired ordinances while producing little gain in constitutional
enforcement.
Id. at 115. Many of Sterk's arguments parallel those raised by Lopatka, infra notes
290-91 and accompanying text.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36. For a discussion of the Act, see infra notes 194-220
and accompanying text.
132. The treble damages provision of the Sherman Act appears to be
mandatory, not discretionary, which has caused concern. Treble damages are apparently required in all cases in which damages are awarded, even when regular or no
damages might be more appropriate. Huge antitrust awards could have had a "devastating" impact on a municipal treasury. Civiletti, supra note 129, at 385. Phillip
Areeda and Donald Turner, however, indicate that, although punitive sanctions
should not be permitted, only injunctive relief is available to the antitrust plaintiff
and to the courts as a preferred remedy in a suit against a municipality. 1 P.
HANDBOOK
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A major analytical problem with the state action doctrine is the
resulting impact of the antitrust laws on the state-federal allocation
of regulatory power. 133 Hovenkamp and MacKerron note that the
current doctrine interferes with state and federal relationships in two
ways. First, the federal government interferes with state decisions on
division of regulatory power between state and local government.
Second, it permits the states to determine the scope and the impact
of the antitrust laws as applied to the actions of their local governing
bodies.' 3' The federal government, not the state, should decide what
markets need federal regulation. Professor Wiley expresses this concern in another way, by claiming that the state "can express 'sovereign state policies' just as importantly by delegating key decisions
about specific policy details to decentralized decisionmakers

. . .

as

by reserving them
to centralized organs of state authority, such as
13 5
the legislature.
Wiley also raises efficiency concerns by identifying four costs
imposed by the clear-statement-of-state-policy-rule. First, the rule
discourages delegation, and since "[d]elegation of responsibility permits greater governmental efficiency," 138 the rule makes the "process of state government more time-consuming and costly. '137 Second, the doctrine may discourage otherwise efficient policies that fail
to meet the state authorization and supervision requirements. 138 Wiley uses Boulder as an example in which the city's attempt to increase competition in the long run was defeated by the Midcal standard. Third, the Boulder holding that home rule designation of cities
does not make them sovereign will sacrifice local autonomy. Cities
again will be obliged to apply to their state legislatures for authority
to legislate in areas of local concern. 3 9 Lastly, the rule disturbs the
allocation of state and federal power by dictating how states must
implement their policies.""
The Boulder case is frequently criticized for its limited reading
of the home rule power. To protect themselves adequately from antiAREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 217(a)(1) (1978). Nevertheless, Civi-

letti's point is well taken since large damage awards against cities were possible
until recently.
133. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 132, %217(a)(1); Lopatka,
supra note 129, at 23.

134. Hovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 24, at 724; see also Civiletti,
supra note 129, at 387-88; Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REv. 713, 736 (1986).
135. Wiley, supra note 134, at 731.

136. Id. at 732.
137. Id. at 734.
138.
139.
140.

Id.

Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
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trust attack, municipalities could be forced to approach their state

legislatures and compete with many other important legislative issues to be considered with limited time and resources. One author
hypothesizes that the home rule powers granted to municipalities in
recent years free the state legislatures to focus on more state-wide

concerns. 141 Justice Rehnquist, in his Boulder dissent, also raised
this issue. 42

In retrospect, although Justice Rehnquist may have overstated
the potential disruption of state and local relations in his dissent, the

thrust of his criticism remains valid. The state action doctrine effectively can coerce state legislatures to allocate regulatory power to

their local governing bodies. This point can be illustrated by comparing the Oregon and Washington state land use planning statutes. 143
The Oregon statute requires statewide planning goals, strict state supervision, and limited local discretion. 4 On the other hand, the

Washington system emphasizes local planning and gives local governments substantial discretion. 45 The Washington approach might
not survive antitrust scrutiny except in implementing certain environmental programs. 46 However, the Oregon system also could have
problems if, notwithstanding the regulation's effect of displacing
competition, the legislature failed to consider its anticompetitive aspects and did not intend displacement." 7 Thus, although each system is justifiable under land use planning theory, constitutional law
and other relevant legal principles, each might pose problems in the
141.

Civiletti, supra note 129, at 387-88; see also Wiley, supra note 134, at

735.
142. Justice Rehnquist stated:
The decision today effectively destroys the "home rule" movement in this
country, through which local governments have obtained, not without persistent state opposition, a limited autonomy over matters of local concern.
. . . In order to defend itself from Sherman Act attacks, the home rule
municipality will have to cede its authority back to the State.
455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
143. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 129.
144. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.855 (1983). Recently, New Jersey also enacted a state-wide planning act. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-196 to 207 (West Supp.
1986).

145.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 5.63.010-.130 (1965 & Supp. 1986) (plan-

ning commission); §§ 35A.63.010-.170 (1986 Special Pamphlet) (planning and zoning in code cities; optional municipal code); §§ 36.70.010-.970 (1964 & Supp. 1986)
(Planning Enabling Act).
146. Comment, supra note 129, at 778-79.
147. Id. at 769-72. Hovenkamp & MacKerron stated that: "In addition, the
state action doctrine has forced the federal courts to look for state legislative 'intent'
to displace the federal antitrust laws. Yet, there may be no state legislative intent
expressed because the state legislation was not designed with the modern state action exemption in mind." Hovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 24, at 724 (footnote omitted).
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antitrust arena. The Washington system is vulnerable because it
lacks specific state authorization or policy objectives and leaves such
objectives to the local legislative bodies. The Oregon system is subject to state-wide planning goals but may lack sufficient demonstrable state consideration of the consequences of its policies on competition, as implemented by local governments. Furthermore, a state
that elects a more localized system of planning has a greater risk of
antitrust liability for its municipalities than a state that elects to retain control over general land use planning. This should be a matter
for state and local discretion.
Conversely, a few states are attempting to confer a blanket immunity from the antitrust laws for their local governments.148 These
states have enacted statutes that range from very general to very
specific grants of immunity for various local activities. Most of the
statutes are fairly recent and, therefore, have not been challenged.
The state action doctrine would seem to permit an exemption from
antitrust liability when such a statute is in effect. This approach,
however, permits the state to determine permissible types of anticompetitive conduct. Because the antitrust laws are federal statutes, immunity from those laws should be a matter of federal law. 149
The state action exemption is also criticized because of the inherent inconsistency of antitrust liability with the nature of municipal regulation. For example, Professor Areeda points out that the
grant of zoning power necessarily reflects a state determination that
regulation should displace market competition otherwise protected
by antitrust law. 150 Zoning, similar to other municipal functions, is
inherently anticompetitive in nature and impact. In a zoning situation, certain uses of a specific parcel of land may be permitted and
others may be prohibited. For example, the central business district
in a medium-sized community may not be able to compete with both
a large regional shopping mall and smaller strip shopping areas. The
local legislative body may decide, as a matter of public policy, to
prioritize preservation of the downtown retail business area and to
restrict suburban retail development. This type of situation has cre148. See the discussion of statutory remedies infra notes 175-93 and accompanying text.
149. This is closely related to the preemption and supremacy clause problems
discussed infra notes 221-77 amd accompanying text.
150. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 132, at I 212.7d (Supp. 1982);
see also Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: Litigation Strategies, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 395 (1983). Vanderstar stated that "[a] decision by a municipal government to displace competition in pursuit of some other
public purpose seems to lack the certain essential qualities of the type of conduct
that normally falls under the ban of the Sherman Act." Id. at 399 (footnote
omitted).
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ated antitrust problems in the past. 5 '

As illustrated by the cases discussed in the previous section, denial of a building permit or a decision to rezone may have anticompetitive consequences, yet may be clearly authorized by the zoning

statute. Courts have failed to find municipal antitrust immunity,
however, when an ulterior motive on the part of local officials is alleged. 152 This is true despite the fact that such decisions are almost
inevitably anticompetitive, particularly to the property owner whose

permit application is denied.
b. Problems of Application
Courts and commentators also raise some practical problems of
application. Section one of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 53 Implicitly,
this means that more than one person must be involved.15 4 A plaintiff may confront what has been called the "bathtub conspiracy"
problem-the issue of whether a government can conspire with itself
or its agencies. 55 Professor Areeda notes that a conspiracy cannot
exist when officials agree among themselves, even if their decision is
later held unconstitutional, erroneous, or otherwise unauthorized by
law.'5 6 Nor can agreement on issues of policy-a "policy bias"151. See Scott v. City of Sioux City, 436 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 91-92);
Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 110-11);
Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussed
supra note 92 and accompanying text); see also supra notes 90-91, 110-18 and
accompanying text (shopping center cases).
152. For a discussion of this issue, see Mandelker, Control of Competition as
a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14 ZONING DIG. 33 (1962); Weaver & Duerksen,
CentralBusiness District Planning and the Control of Outlying Shopping Centers,
14 URB. L. ANN. 57, 65-69 (1977).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
154. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2
(2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS], which
states: "Regardless of the purpose or effect on competition, Section I (of the Sherman Act) 'does not prohibit independent business actions and decisions' by a single
entity." Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). A seventh circuit decision, Contractor Util.
Sales Co. v. Certain-teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1981), cited in
ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, states: "The fundamental prerequisite is
unlawful conduct by two or more parties pursuant to an agreement, explicit or implied. Solely unilateral conduct, regardless of its anti-competitive effects is not prohibited by Section I."Id. at 1074.
155. Vanderstar, supra note 150, at 401.
156. Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. REV. 435, 451 (1981). Recently, the Supreme Court held that a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each
other under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
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constitute a conspiracy. The Supreme Court, in Fisher v. City of
Berkeley, 157 addressed this issue. The Court stated that the concerted action required by section one of the Sherman Act is not pre-

sent when a governmental unit unilaterally imposes a restriction. 15 8
Thus, the fact that all landlords in the City of Berkeley were obligated to comply with a rent control ordinance was not sufficient to
establish a conspiracy. 59 The Court, however, noted that some governmental restrictions grant private actors regulatory power and are

subject to Sherman Act attack under the provisions of section one. 60
A second conspiracy problem for plaintiffs is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which holds that antitrust laws are not applicable
to a party who seeks legislative action, even if the action seeks to

injure competition.' 6 ' The lobbying efforts, however, must genuinely
attempt to influence legislation. 8 2 Municipalities often must choose
between individuals, businesses, and other entities. Those parties are
entitled to lobby their lawmakers and such interaction cannot be
deemed a conspiracy. 83 Practically, the courts may have difficulty

Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
157. 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
158. "The ordinary relationship between the government and those who must
obey its regulatory commands whether they wish to or not is not enough to establish
a conspiracy." Id. at 1050.
159. Id. at 1049-50.
160. Id. at 1050. The Court cited two cases as examples of this hybrid type of
regulation: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980) and Schwegmann Bros. V. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951).
161. The doctrine arose from two cases: Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Noerr, truck operators brought suit
against several railroads alleging that the railroads successfully conducted a massive
publicity and lobbying effort designed to convince the Governor of Pennsylvania to
veto a bill favorable to the trucking industry. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, stating that the Sherman Act does not prohibit joint efforts to influence legislation that will restrain competition. 365 U.S. at 136. Furthermore, to hold otherwise might infringe upon the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances under the first amendment, and would impair the government's ability to
act as a representative of the people. Id. at 136-38.
In Pennington, several large coal companies persuaded the Secretary of Labor
to set higher minimum wages for companies selling coal to the Tennessee Valley
Authority (T.V.A.), and urged the T.V.A. to buy coal only from these companies.
The action sought to eliminate smaller coal companies. The Court held that the
intent underlying the attempts to influence legislation was irrelevant. 381 U.S. at
670. See Comment, supra note 31, at 711-13.
162. This is a also known as the "sham exception" to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; see also Vanderstar, supra note 150, at 406-07.
163. See Areeda, supra note 156, at 452; Levin, The Antitrust Challenge to
Local Government Protection of the Central Business District, 55 U. COLo. L. REv.
21 (1983); Spiegel, Local Government and the Terror of Antitrust, 69 A.B.A. J.
163, 165 (1983).
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distinguishing successful legislative lobbying from an antitrust
conspiracy.
A further application problem is the use of the "rule of reason"
analysis in the municipal context and the concurrent danger of a
return to substantive due process 6 4 in the antitrust area. Although
the Sherman Act is statutory, and substantive due process is consti-

tutional, the mode of analysis is arguably similar when the rule of
reason is applied to municipal regulation. In either case, the court
focuses on whether the regulation in question unreasonably restricts
competition. Alternatively, the court balances the benefits to the
public health, safety, and welfare against the detriments to the competitive process. The Supreme Court applied the rule of reason analysis to the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1911.165 The rule provides that
16 6
the activity challenged must not unreasonably restrict competition.
Later that year, the Court expanded upon the rule of reason by de-

fining restraint of trade as activities that unduly
restrict competition
1 67
or unduly obstruct the due course of trade.

In his Boulder dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the application of the rule of reason analysis to the municipal decision making
process.1 6 8 Rehnquist argued that if municipalities may or must balance community benefits versus anticompetitive effects, "the federal

courts will be called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation
that this Court has properly rejected."169 The concern of many com164. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
425-51 (2d ed. 1983).
165. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Supreme
Court also has adopted a test, known as the per se rule, for antitrust problems.
When applying the per se rule, the Court undertakes only a limited inquiry to determine whether the actor engaged in the conduct alleged, and whether the conduct
falls within the categories of behavior described as per se unlawful. Historically,
these categories have included price fixing, group boycotts, tying arrangements, and
horizontal market division. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
154, at 22. The "dangers" of substantive due process do not apply to the per se rule.
Arguably, however, per se analysis simply is not appropriate in the municipal antitrust context. Note, Municipal Antitrust: An Overview, 60 CHi-KENT L. REV. 349,
371 (1984).
166. 221 U.S. at 62.
167. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). For
the origin of the rule of reason, see ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 154, at 15-21; P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
303 (2d ed. 1974); A.
STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS: ANTITRUST LAWS § 40 (1972).
168. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. Id at 67. The concept of substantive due process required courts to determine the constitutionality of government regulatory measures by deciding whether
the regulation had a substantial relation to the police power goals of public health,
safety, and welfare. During the late 1800's and the early part of this century, the
Supreme Court frequently struck down legislation that, in its view, did not bear this
LAW
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mentators, shared by Justice Rehnquist, is that the rule of reason
analysis gives the courts the unfettered discretion reminiscent of that
permitted under substantive due process analysis at the turn of the

century. 170 According to Churchwell, these fears were realized in the
California Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v. City of Berkeley."'
Although the Supreme Court has never considered a municipal
liability antitrust case on the merits, the criticism of rule of reason
balancing in the municipal context is valid. It exacerbates many of
the problems discussed in this section. If federal courts must balance
pro and anticompetitive effects of local legislation, the results will be
unpredictable. This would increase the deterrent effect of antitrust

suits on municipalities. More fundamentally, rule of reason balancing in the municipal context potentially allows federal courts to decide issues within the province of state and local legislatures. The
substantial relation to the police power goals. Beginning in 1937, however, the Court
began to shun this method of analysis, and has subsequently rejected it, at least for
economic-based regulation. As Nowak, Rotunda, and Young indicate: "[T]he independent review of legislation during this period [pre-1937] resulted in an unprincipled control of social and economic legislation. . . . The justices had complete discretion to determine the permissibility of economic and social welfare legislation." J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 164, at 443-44 (footnotes omitted).
For well-known cases striking down economic based legislation, see Morehead
v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (rejecting minimum wage law for
women); Hamm~r v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking child labor law);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking maximum hours of work per
week law).
For cases reversing the substantive due process trend, see City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
170. See M. LEE, ANTITRUST LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 19 (1985);
Civiletti, supra note 129, at 387; Hovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 24, at 72425. But see Brummitt, Zoning and Planningand Antitrust, in 1984 INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING,

&

EMINENT DOMAIN

241 (rule of reason/balancing appropriate in this

area).
171. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd, 106 S.
Ct. 1045 (1986). Professor Churchwell stated: "It [the court] then completely scuttled eighty years of common law antitrust development and declared a new standard
of liability 'modeled after the [United States Supreme] Court's commerce clause
cases' for judging a conflict between the antitrust laws and a municipal ordinance."
Churchwell, The Federal Antitrust Implications of Local Rent Control: A Plaintiffs Primer, 112 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 919, 945 (1985) (footnote omitted). The
Fisher court stated that:
[I]f a municipal regulation has a proper local purpose, is rationally related
to the municipality's legitimate exercise of its police power, and operates in
an evenhanded manner, it must be upheld. . . unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the city's purposes could be achieved as effectively by means
that would have a less intrusive impact on federal antitrust policies.
37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690. For discussion of the
Fisher case, see infra notes 242-76 and accompanying text.
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courts may second guess municipal decision makers' determinations
that some restraint on competition is necessary for the general
health, safety, and welfare. Moreover, such rule of reasoning balancing further disrupts the allocation of state and federal powers.
The rule of reason balancing analysis may work well in traditional antitrust cases involving two private actors. The concerns are,
or should be, different, however, when a municipality is involved.
Professor Deutsch suggests that local governments do not base decisions on economic factors and should be immune under the antitrust
laws, particularly in land use planning.7 2 He also notes that local
governments are constrained by their mandate to legislate for the
health, safety, and welfare of the community. 17 3 To apply the same
standards used in evaluating the impacts of a private, commercial
decision to the effects of a municipal decision is conceptually improper. The motivations and goals of a local government differ
greatly from those of private business. 7 4
Thus, the state action exemption as used by the courts today is
riddled with analytical and practical problems. For defendants, it potentially deters useful and legitimate municipal activity and is inconsistent with the very nature of many areas of local legislation, including land use planning and zoning decisions. For plaintiffs, the
effective defense of Noerr-Pennington immunity and the problem of
establishing that a conspiracy exists frustrate potential antitrust
claims. The use of rule of reason analysis on a merits question can be
detrimental to both parties by making the results of a lawsuit unpredictable. Additionally, evaluating municipal action should differ
from evaluating private action. Most fundamentally, the doctrine
plays havoc with the traditional state and federal distribution of regulatory power. This problematic preemption issue will be discussed
again in Part III.
172. Deutsch, Antitrust Challenges to Local Zoning and Other Land Use
Controls, 60 CHI-KENT L. REv. 63 (1984). Professor Deutsch states that "[w]hile
local governments are economic actors in some aspect of their existence, the land
use control process is one where the local government is not acting as an economic
entity but as a regulator of the private decision process." Id. at 86.
173. Id. at 85. For example, local land use decisions involve choices between
residential and commercial development, or single versus multi family density.
Deutsch also points out that the political process will help control land use decision
making.
174. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Boulder, indicated that
"certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private
parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local government." 455
U.S. at 56-57 n.20.
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III.
A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE ANTITRUST PROBLEM FOR
MUNICIPALITIES

State Statutory Solutions

A few state legislatures have either considered or enacted statutes17 5protecting municipalities from state or federal antitrust liability.
In 1983, Illinois enacted one of the earliest and broadest statutes of this sort. The statute attempts to make the state action
exemption fully available to home rule and nonhome rule municipalities and townships. 17 6 According to the statute, state policy dictates
that "all powers granted, either expressly or by necessary implication" to local governmental units may7 7 be exercised by them "not'
withstanding effects on competition.'
The Illinois legislature recently amended its policy statement
concerning municipal antitrust liability. The new sections express an
even stronger state policy to protect local governments, their officers,
agents, or employees from liability.1 7 8 The new statute provides that
the state action exemption shall be "liberally construed in favor of
such municipalities and the agents, employees and officers thereof,
such exemption shall be available notwithstanding that the action of
the municipality or its agents, officers or employees constitutes an
irregular exercise of constitutional or statutory powers." 17 The Illinois Act limits plaintiffs' remedies to injunctive relief, as does the
new federal act discussed below.1 80
North Dakota enacted a similar statute in 1983.181 The North
Dakota statute extends "[a]ll immunity of the state from the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act" to any city or city governing
body when acting within the scope of its authority; when acting
within its authority, the1 82
statute presumes the city is acting in furtherance of state policy.
Similarly, a Maryland statute lists several areas in which a local
government may displace competition with regulation. 8 3 Enacted in
175.

See Comment, The Federal Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984

and the 1985 Amendments to the FloridaAntitrust Act: A Survey and Analysis of
Florida Local Government Antitrust Vulnerability, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 77, 10508 & nn.123-38 (1985). That Comment notes that statutes were considered but
failed to pass in Colorado, New Jersey, Mississippi, and California. Id. at 106.
176. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-1-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); id. ch. 139,
§ 4-2 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
177. Id. ch. 24, § 1-1-10.
178.

Id.

179. Id.
180. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(Supp. III 1985), is discussed, infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text.
181.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-01-22 (1983).

182. Id.
183.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2A (Supp. 1986).
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1984, the statute provides that it is "the policy of the State to authorize each municipal corporation to displace or limit competition"
in the areas of public transportation, water and sewerage systems,
port regulation and award of concessions, or the leasing or subleasing of property owned or leased by the municipality. 84 In each subsection the statute lists general1 purposes
for which the authority to
85
limit competition may be used.
Some states have protective but limited legislation. For example, Virginia enacted a statute enumerating specific grants of authority to regulate cable television by the governing bodies of any
county, city, or town.18 6 The statute also contains a policy statement
indicating that the grant of authority to local governments to displace or limit competition in187cable television is based on state concerns for the public benefit.
A Louisiana statute extends immunity from liability under the
antitrust law to "any municipal corporation, parish, sewerage or
water district acting within the scope of [its granted] authority."'8
The subsection also presumes that the local governmental unit acts
in furtherance of state policy when acting within the section's authority.18 9 The statute specifically authorizes both displacement of
competition with regulation in this area and a monopolistic public
service.190
Narrow state protection from antitrust liability is offered by a
Tennessee statute granting "a municipality other than a power district" authority to "displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public service" to control the collection and disposal of solid waste in
connection with the construction, financing, operation, or maintenance of an energy production facility.191
The future of such statutes is unclear. States may enact legisla184. Id. § 2A(a).
185. For example, in publicly owned or leased land, the purposes are:
to utilize properly the assets of the municipality for the best public purpose; to provide necessary or desirable governmental services at the lowest
possible cost; to protect the public from unscrupulous business practices
and excessive prices; to provide for the accessibility to public property by
as many citizens as possible; and to promote the general welfare by utilizing public property for the benefit of the citizens of the community.
Id. § 2A(d). The statute also specifically grants authority to limit or displace competition in each area. For example, in the area of water and sewer systems, the
municipalities may grant franchises, enter into contracts, set rates, etc. "notwithstanding any anticompetitive effect." Id. § 2A(b).
186. VA. CODE §§ 15.1-23.1 (Supp. 1986).
187. Id.
188. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4169(E)(2) (West Supp. 1986).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 33:4169(E)(1).
191. TENN.CODE ANN. § 7-54-103(d) (1985).
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tion limiting liability under state antitrust law. In view of recent Supreme Court decisions, however, statutes designed to confer broad
federal antitrust immunity probably will be insufficient to protect
municipalities. Rather, specific legislation is required. 9 2 Furthermore, as demonstrated by the statutes discussed, the varied levels of
protection granted by the states foster inconsistent results under the
antitrust laws in federal courts. Finally, these state statutes may create direct conflicts, leading to supremacy clause and preemption
problems. For example, the Illinois statute purportedly dictates that
the federal law of the state action exemption should be liberally construed in favor of the municipal defendants. 193
B.

The Federal Statutory Solution
1. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
Congress enacted the Local Government Antitrust Act of

19841" in response to outcomes in many well-publicized cases and to

widespread criticism of the state action doctrine as applied by the
courts. The Act took effect retroactively.'95 It provides generally that
"[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs or attorney's fees may be
recovered from any local government, or official or employee thereof
acting in an official capacity"'' 98 or "in any claim based on any official action directed by a local government,
or official or employee
97
thereof acting in an official capacity.'
The Act has been criticized both for eliminating treble damages
liability and for not granting complete immunity to the municipalities. According to some authors the Act is unlikely to deter potential
antitrust claimants because most plaintiffs already seek injunctive,
rather than monetary, relief. 98 Although the Act eliminates the
specter of treble damage suits, it fails to protect developers and circumvents the purposes of permitting treble damage remedies. These
purposes are: to make the plaintiff whole; counterbalance the diffi192. See, e.g., the discussion of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, supra notes 64-69 and
accompanying text.
193. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-1-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. III 1985). The complete text of the Act is
reproduced herein as Appendix A.
195. Id. § 36(b). The Act took effect 30 days prior to its enactment on Oct.
24, 1984.
196. Id. § 35(a).
197. Id. § 36(a). A local government is defined as "a city, county, parish,
town, township, village, or any other general function governmental unit established
by State law or ... a school district, sanitary district, or any other special function
governmental unit established by State law in one or more States." Id. § 34(1).
198. M. LEE, supra note 170, at 4. Lee notes that many suits combine antitrust claims with constitutional, tort, contract, and other claims.
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culty and expense of a private action; and deter anticompetitive conduct. Deterrence is achieved by promoting private enforcement,
which saves the government time and money and vindicates the public interest in free competition, and by punishing wrongdoers. 199
Critics also claim that municipal taxpayers benefit from their elected
officials' decisions. Therefore, the fact that taxpayers eventually
might bear the losses of an antitrust suit should not exempt municipalities from paying money damages. 0
2. Recent Cases Decided Under the Act
Several cases have been decided under the Act's provisions since
it became effective at the end of 1984.201 The majority of the recent

cases concern the Act's retroactive applicability to cases commenced
prior to its effective date of September 24, 1984. Section 35(b) of
the Act requires the defendant to prove that, "in light of all the circumstances, including the stage of litigation and the availability of
alternative relief under the Clayton Act, .

.

. it would be inequitable

not to apply this subsection to a pending case." 202 The section also
indicates that a jury verdict, district court judgment, or any subsequent action is prima facie evidence that the Act is not applicable
retroactively. 203 For example, in a case in which the plaintiff filed
suit in 1981 and received a jury verdict in 1984, the defendants
failed to show "compelling equities" to persuade the court to apply
the Act retroactively. Therefore, the defendants were unable to rebut
the statutorily created prima facie evidence that the Act should not
apply. 04
A Pennsylvania district court also declined to apply the statute
retroactively because the case before it had been pending for two
years before the statute was enacted and because discovery was al199. See Merriam, Limiting Land Use Liability, 1985
§ 7.03(3).

ZONING AND PLAN-

NING LAw HANDBOOK

200. See Note, supra note 165, at 381-83.
201. Some cases have been dismissed at the district court level without much
discussion or need to interpret the statute. See, e.g., Montauk-Carribean Airways,
Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's dismissal of
airline's claim for money damages against town). In Palm Springs Medical Clinic,
Inc. v. Desert Hosp., 628 F. Supp. 454, 457 (C.D. Cal. 1986), a California district
court decided that a hospital district fit the definition of local government under the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. The court examined the Act and its legislative history and determined that Congress intended the Act to apply to such a
district. Id. at 458-64. The court also found that local governments have absolute
immunity from antitrust damage liability under the Act. Id. at 459-64.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 35(b) (Supp. III 1985).
203. Id.
204. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 188 (N.D. I11.
1986).
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most complete.20 5 Additionally, a Michigan court denied retroactive
relief in a case initially filed in 1978 but that was in pretrial discovery as a new case after the district
court's judgment was reversed
20 6
and remanded by the circuit court.
Cases or claims for damages that have been dismissed at the
district court level include suits that were in early stages of litigation
when the Act took effect.2 0 7 A Wyoming district court granted an
intermediate level of relief, using the Act to limit the plaintiffs' recovery to actual damages, rather than the trebled, punitive damages.20 8 The court expressed concern for the taxpayers because of an

existing jury award against the city in a breach of contract suit for
$64,000, with potential liability for attorney's fees. This result is peripheral to the language of the Act since section 35(b) provides only
for the potential retroactive application of section 35(a), which bars
awarding damages, costs, etc. to plaintiffs in certain antitrust suits

under the Clayton Act. 20 9
A Colorado district court granted relief in a case in which discovery was complete and the suit was ready for trial. The case had
been filed twenty months previously. 210 The court dismissed damage
claims against the town and various town officials after considering
the stage of litigation, the availability of alternative relief, the level
of potential harm to the local unit of government, the degree to

which the action was based on federal law, and the good faith of the
municipality. Although the statute only enumerated the first two

factors, 2 "1the court found that the Act's legislative history deline-

205. Meetinghouse Assoc. v. Warwick Township, Civ. Act. No. 82-5226
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
206. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 612 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.
Mich. 1985).
207. See, e.g., Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 623 F. Supp. 281
(N.D. II!. 1985) (suit filed 13 months prior to Act's effective date but was in pretrial discovery); S. Kane & Son, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 623 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (suit in early discovery and plaintiff could obtain relief from other defendants); Chris' Wrecker Serv. v. Town of Fairfield, 619 F. Supp. 480 (D. Conn.
1985) (though suit in early stages plaintiffs' losses would be redressed by actual
damages); Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D.
La. 1985) (suit in pretrial discovery when Act became effective); TCI Cablevision,
Inc. v. City of Jefferson, 604 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (suit filed Sept. 7,
1984; Act became effective Sept. 24, 1984).
208. Everts v. Board of Trustees of S. Lincoln Hosp., 604 F. Supp. 40, 45 (D.
Wyo. 1985).
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 35(a), (b) (Supp. III 1985). The Everts court noted that
the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended to limit "alternative remedies" under the Act to injunctive relief. 604 F. Supp. at 44 (citing H.R.
REP, No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984)).
210. Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Town of Mt. Crested Butte, 607 F. Supp. 448
(D. Colo. 1985).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a).
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ated the other three.212 The court did not, however, dismiss the monetary claims against a private defendant because such claims cannot
be retroactively barred under the Act.2 3 The Act specifically provides that the section shielding private parties acting under government direction does not apply to cases commenced before the Act's
effective date. 14
A Texas district court found that the Act was retroactively applicable to litigation that was seven years old.21 5 The court noted
that pretrial discovery was not complete and that the plaintiffs could
seek alternative relief.218 The court also found that the cities exercised their normal regulatory authority in furtherance of state law
and that a treble damages award would have an adverse impact on
the municipalities. 17
Future cases will likely focus on the substantive portion of section 4 of the Act, which bars damage recovery against "a person
based on official action directed by a local government, or official or
employee thereof acting in an official capacity. ' ' 21 8 Private individuals or businesses may argue that a municipality directed their actions. The success of such an argument depends on the degree of
control219and close relations between the municipality and the private
party.
The Local Government Antitrust Act is helpful because it relieves municipalities of the threat of huge damage awards. Nonetheless, the possibility of costly, time-consuming litigation still exists
and the chilling effects of litigation for injunctive relief on municipalities persist. The state action exemption issue remains problematic because injunctive relief remains available to plaintiffs. 220
Furthermore, the Act itself does not completely protect public
officials or private parties acting at the direction of local government. To determine monetary liability under the antitrust laws, the
courts still must determine whether an individual is acting in an official or private capacity. The Act, however, fails to facilitate court
analysis in this area. Apparently, the Act's sole function is to protect
212. 607 F. Supp. at 454.
213. Id. at 451-52.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 36(b).
215. Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
216. Id. at 351-52.
217. Id.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 36(a).
219. A Pennsylvania district court rejected this argument, finding that the
Act did not protect a private electrical inspection agency. The local government
licensed company was not required to interfere with the plaintiffs' efforts to get
approval to conduct inspections. Atlantic-Inland, Inc. v. Township of W. Goshen,
Civ. Act. No. 86-416 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
220. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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municipal treasuries. This goal is legitimate but ignores the conceptual and practical problems that plague the current application of
the antitrust laws to municipalities.
Although many commentators advocate some type of qualified
immunity, middle-ground solutions do not alleviate problems created
by the state action doctrine, which itself is a qualified immunity theory. Instead, Congress should grant cities, their officials, and those
acting at their direction, complete immunity from the antitrust laws.
Municipal decision making by nature is not conducive to antitrust
analysis. The current state action exemption does not function well
in practice and leads to inconsistent, confusing results in the court
decisions. The state and federal balance of regulatory power is upset
by the present status of the doctrine. Moreover, state legislative attempts to protect local government foster inconsistent results and potential supremacy clause problems.
C. The Preemption Rationale
1. Preemption Generally
Perhaps the most famous advocate of preemption analysis in antitrust cases is Justice Rehnquist, who discussed it extensively in his
Boulder dissent.221 Subsequently, several law review articles addressed preemption analysis. 222 Rehnquist argues that a state statute
with anticompetitive consequences that is invalidated by the Parker
doctrine does not violate the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, accordingto Rehnquist, such a statute is unenforceable because federal law
preempts it. 223 Rehnquist regards preemption and exemption as distinct concepts. The preemption issue arises when two different sovereigns have enacted potentially conflicting statutes. Exemption concerns arise when the "interplay between the enactments of a single
sovereign" is at issue.224 The difference between preemption and exemption is important because the presumptions involved in their application are contradictory. Preemption is found only if Congress
clearly intended federal law to supersede state law-preemption renders state law invalid. In contrast, an exemption approach tends to
uphold and reconcile both statutory schemes.225 According to Rehnquist, preemption analysis avoids such problems as requiring federal
courts to second-guess local legislative bodies or "to engage in
221. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222. Hovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 24, at 778-79; Wiley, A Capture
Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1986).
223. 455 U.S. at 64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 61.
225. Id. at 61-62.
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standardless review of the reasonableness of local legislation."22 6
Although many commentators agree with Justice Rehnquist

that preemption analysis should replace exemption analysis as a
means of federal control over municipal activity, others argue that
227
the Sherman Act preempts any legislation inconsistent with it.
This pure preemption approach, unlike Rehnquist's test, completely
disregards the state action doctrine.
Professor Michael Conant 228 argues that no state action exemption should be available when state and federal law conflict. Thus,
when state economic regulation conflicts with the federal antitrust
2 30
laws, the supremacy clause 22 renders the state law unenforceable.

According to Conant, the Parker decision is invalid because it directly violates the supremacy clause. 231 He argues that the Constitu-

tion permits state or local economic regulation to stand only when
the regulation's effects232are procompetitive--consistent with the goals

of the antitrust laws.

The pure preemption approach appears unsound. Judge Easter-

brook rejects the supremacy clause analysis because it forces courts
to invalidate all state laws that are inconsistent with substantive an-

titrust law and policy. This approach prevents state and local governments from legislating in many important safety, health, and welfare

areas. 233 Furthermore, it creates analytical and practical problems
226. Id. at 68.
227. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 132, T 217(a)(2); Lopatka,
supra note 129, at 69-71; Williamson, Commentary: The Reagan Administration's
Position on Antitrust Liability of Municipalities,32 CATH. U.L. REv. 371, 377-78
(1983).
228. Conant, The Supremacy Clause and State Economic Controls: The Antitrust Maze, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 255 (1983).
229. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land." Id.
230. Conant, supra note 228, at 256-57.
231. Id. at 283. "The Sherman Act contains no express exemption for persons
and firms violating its provisions under state compulsion and supervision and its
language does not imply one. .

.

. In Parker,.

.

. the state action defense was ap-

proved with full knowledge that the state law was inconsistent with, and contrary to,
the mandate of competition in the Sherman Act. .

.

. The states have no power to

create exemptions to federal statutes. That is the essence of the Supremacy Clause."
Id. at 271.
232. Conant also notes that the antitrust laws have always been considered
"quasi-constitutional" in character. Id. at 261. He quotes Justice Marshall in
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972): "They (the antitrust laws) are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." Id. at 261-62.
233. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. ECON.
23, 24 (1983).
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because Congress
never intended the antitrust laws to apply to
34
municipalities.1
2 35
Professor Wiley offers another preemption mode of analysis.
He would apply a capture theory to antitrust problems that would
preempt a state or local regulation that meets the following criteria:
1) it restrains market rivalry, 2) it is not protected by a federal antitrust exemption, 3) it does not respond directly to a substantial market inefficiency, and 4) it results from producer capture. 36 The first
three criteria are self-explanatory; producer capture is a government
market regulation enacted to benefit producers rather than consumers. Under Wiley's theory, government benefits, such as price supports and entry level barriers to new competition, are widely available to market producers. Well-organized producers eagerly seek such
benefits, while consumer opposition is frequently diffuse and unorganized. He concludes that producer political power frequently results in government market legislation.2 37 Thus, Wiley suggests that
courts recognize proof of capture by "determin[ing] that producer
political participation was decisive" in securing enactment of the legislation or by a finding that the facial effects of the regulation
clearly point to "producer capture as the single most likely explanation of its origin. ' 23 8
Although Wiley's article anticipates objections to his capture
theory solution, he fails to respond to its major problem-the proposed method of proof of capture flies in the face of the first amendment and the Noerr-Pennington exception 23 9 to the antitrust laws.
Further, his theory is subject to many of the same criticisms leveled
against the present system. For example, it is not clear that the test
is easily understood, predictive of results, or readily applicable by
courts.24 0 The theory allows regulations that represent legitimate and
reasonable exercises of municipal discretion to be invalidated because they meet the four criteria. For example, in shopping center
cases in which a regulation restricts development in order to preserve
the central business district, a court easily could conclude that the
regulation meets the four criteria, particularly capture. Yet, most
234. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 132, 1 217(a)(1); Lopatka,
supra note 129, at 23. Although Congress did not expressly exempt states and their
local sub-parts, the interpretation of the commerce clause at the time would have
rendered such an exemption unthinkable and unnecessary. See supra notes 24-25
and accompanying text.
235. Wiley, supra note 222, at 713.
236. Id. at 743.
237. Id. at 725.
238. Id. at 743, 769-70.
239. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
240. Wiley's theory may be too difficult for courts to apply in real-life situations. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917 (1986).
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courts now would uphold such legislation against an antitrust
challenge. 41
Preemption analysis is problematic because it only avoids second-guessing local governments in their economic and social decision
making. The remaining criticisms of the doctrine persist because the
federal courts still must determine whether the activity can be saved
by the Parker doctrine.
2. Fisher and Preemption
The Supreme Court recently decided Fisher v. City of Berkeley,242 which involved a challenge to the city's rent control ordinance
by a group of landlords. The landlords claimed that the rent control
program constituted price fixing, rendering the program a per se violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged vertical price fixing between the landlord and the rent stabilization boards and horizontal
price fixing between all covered landlords.24 3 In holding the ordinance constitutional, the California Supreme Court declined to use
traditional antitrust analysis, noting that such analysis is inapplicable to municipalities.244 Instead, the court employed a substantive
due process test to determine whether the rent control program bore
a rational relationship to legitimate public purpose.245
The posture of the case and the parties' specific arguments are
unique. During pendency of the appeal to the California Supreme
Court, the dissent in an intervening United States Supreme Court
246
decision, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder
raised the preemption issue. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist characterized the key issue in applying the Parker doctrine as one of preemption rather than exemption. 4 7 The California court in Fisher
held that the ordinance was not preempted by the Sherman Act. 248
In argument before the Supreme Court, the landlords asserted that
no clearly articulated state policy regarding rent control existed and
that the conduct required by the city ordinance directly violated the
241. See Levin, The Antitrust Challenge to Local Government Protection of
the Central Business District, 55 U. CoLo. L. REv. 21, 23 n.6 (1983); Weaver &
Duerksen, supra note 152.
242. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). At trial, the only issue was a constitutional
question. On appeal, the landlords raised an antitrust challenge. 37 Cal. 3d at 653,
693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
243. 37 Cal. 3d. at 667, 693 P.2d at 280, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
244. Id. at 672, 693 P.2d at 284, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
245. Id. at 671-77, 693 P.2d at 284-85, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 705-09.
246. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).

247. Id. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the preemption
issue, see infra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
248. 37 Cal. 3d at 660, 693 P.2d at 275, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
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pro competition policy of the Sherman Act.24 9 Therefore, the
supremacy clause preempted the ordinance. 250 The landlords also argued that the California Supreme Court employed improper analysis
because a municipality engaged in anticompetitive conduct is no different than a private economic actor.251 In response, the city argued
that no contract, combination, or conspiracy to restrain trade existed, the effect on competition was not an unreasonable restraint of
trade, and the rent control ordinance had state authorization.2 5 2
The majority opinion affirmed the decision of the California Supreme Court, but limited its analysis to the preemption question and
decided the case on traditional antitrust grounds. 253 The Court rejected the argument that the municipality had engaged in price fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act.2 54
The Court distinguished two prior cases, Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp.,2 55 and California Retail Liquor Dealers
Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,2 56 in which anticompetitive restraints were hybrids-government regulations enforcing private
marketing decisions.2 57 The Court concluded that no preemption
problem existed because the rent controls in Fisherlacked the requisite concerted action to bring them within the Sherman Act.25
Therefore, to consider whether the controls were exempt from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine was unnecessary.2 59 The
Court simply reiterated the preemption standard expressed in Rice v.
Norman Williams Co.,260 that a state statute is not preempted unless
it conflicts irreconcilably with the antitrust laws, or it authorizes or
mandates conduct that necessarily violates antitrust laws.2 6 The
249.

106 S. Ct. at 1048.

250. Id.

251. 54 U.S.L.W. 3367 (1985).
252. Id. at 3368.
253. 106 S. Ct. at 1048.
254. Id. at 1049-50. The Court noted:
The distinction between unilateral and concerted action is critical here.
...A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not become
concerted action within the meaning of the statute simply because it has a
coercive effect among parties who must obey the law ....

Similarly, the

mere fact that all competing property owners must comply with the same
provisions of the Ordinance is not enough to establish a conspiracy among
landlords.
255. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
256. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
257. 106 S.Ct. at 1051.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 458 U.S. 654 (1982). The Rice Court held that a California statute
which permitted liquor distillers to control the distribution of their products within
the state was not preempted. Id. at 656.
261. 106 S.Ct. at 1048.
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Court held that although Rice involved a state statute, the same

analysis was applicable to a municipal regulation. 62

Justice Brennan was the sole dissenter.2 63 He argued that Rice
could be distinguished as a non price restraint on competition

whereas Fisher involved direct price restriction.264 He found Midca12 3 and Schwegmann Bros. 266 to be directly on point. 26 7 Further,
Justice Brennan found that a combination or conspiracy existed between the city and its officials and between the landlords them-

selves.26 8 Finally, Brennan found that the ordinance lacked the requisite authority and clearly articulated, affirmative state policy to
warrant exemption from the antitrust laws under the state action

doctrine. 6 9
Notably, the Fisher Court's preemption analysis varied from
that suggested by Justice Rehnquist in his Boulder dissent,27 in
which a statute that is not saved by the state action doctrine may be
preempted by federal law. 27 ' The Fisher Court apparently decided
the case in reverse order. The Court first considered preemption and

decided that the city ordinance was not preempted by federal law. 2

The Court then indicated in dicta that the state action doctrine
27 3

might have saved the ordinance even if it had been preempted.
This approach seems to conflict with the intrinsic theory of preemption. If the Court wishes to combine the state action doctrine

and preemption analysis in municipal antitrust cases, it is logical to
apply the state action test first to determine whether a clear state
policy to displace competition with regulation exists. The Fisher

Court did not consider this issue because its review was limited to
the preemption question.274 Because the preemption theory is based
262. Id. Justice Powell concurred, noting that the ordinance fell squarely
within the state action exemption of Parker.Id. at 1051-53 (Powell, J., concurring)
(citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). Powell found that the state had a
clearly articulated policy with foreseeable anticompetitive effects. Id. at 1053.
263. Id. at 1053-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 1054 n.l.
265. 445 U.S. 97.
266. 341 U.S. 384.
267. 106 S. Ct. at 1054-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1055.
269. Id. at 1056-57.
270. 455 U.S. 40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the dissent
and the preemption issue, see supra text accompanying notes 221-27.
271. Id. at 63.
272. 106 S.Ct. at 1051.
273. Id. As Justice Marshall's majority opinion states: "We therefore need
not address whether, even if the controls were to mandate § 1 violations, they would
be exempt under the state action doctrine from antitrust scrutiny." Id.
274. Id.
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on the supremacy clause, 5 once a conflict between state or local
and federal law is established, the federal statute should control. Although the preemption analysis proposed in Justice Rehnquist's
Boulder dissent appears to follow this approach, all7 of the dissenters
in Boulder joined the majority opinion in Fisher.11
Moreover, if the state action doctrine had been applied by the
Fisher Court, the preemption issue need not have been discussed. As
Justice Powell noted in his concurrence, the California legislature
expressly authorized the rent control ordinance enacted by the
city.2 77 Powell's concurrence suggests that the state action doctrine
resolved the case and made considering the preemption issue
unnecessary.
Thus, the usefulness of preemption analysis in municipal antitrust cases is questionable. Lower federal courts will have difficulty
applying it, particularly since the Supreme Court's opinion in Fisher
did not reconcile the state action doctrine with preemption analysis.
The Court declined to consider the state action issue and apparently
decided the case in reverse order by deciding the preemption issue
before the state action issue.

IV.

APPROPRIATE RELIEF-IMMUNITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Proposed solutions to problems of analysis and application of
the Parker doctrine and its progeny range from complete immunity
for municipalities to mere modifications of the balancing test. The
proper solution is a federal statutory grant of immunity to local governments from the antitrust laws.
Some authors make a sophisticated economic argument for immunity, claiming that analysis of municipal activities under the antitrust laws is inefficient. One theory proposes that consumers select,
either through the political system or through their choice of places
to live, the mix of regulation and competition that maximizes their
welfare. Economic theory, however, requires certain conditions for
this equilibrium 27 to be reached: 1) people and resources must be
mobile; 2) there must be several jurisdictions from which to select;
275. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

276. See Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist & O'Connor,
J.J., dissenting).

277. 106 S. Ct. at 1052 (Powell, J., concurring).
278. In equilibrium, the economy is perfectly competitive and efficient in that
no other allocation of inputs, outputs, or distribution is possible to make one person
"better" off without making another "worse" off in terms of each person's preferences. See P. AREEDA, supra note 28, at 7.
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3) the jurisdictions must be free to select any mix of laws; and 4)
consequences of a jurisdiction's action must be felt only within that
jurisdiction. 27 9 Whether any of the four conditions can be met is
questionable. The fourth required condition is particularly difficult.
A municipality would have to pay all of the costs of its regulation
and reap all of the benefits - the classic and quintessential problem
of externalities. 8 0
In the zoning context, the problem of regional impacts of local
legislation is illustrated by exclusionary zoning cases. To exclude
low-income housing, local legislatures enacted legislation such as rezoning from multi-family to single-family use; establishing large
minimum lot sizes or floor sizes; and requiring subdivision improvements and public dedications. The ordinances purportedly address
such issues as crime, overcrowding in schools, preservation of the local tax base, and aesthetics. When many municipalities zone to exclude low income housing, however, the low income classes must
congregate in the few areas where they are not excluded. Thus, a
few municipalities must shoulder the burden of accommodating a
large low income population.28 '
Another economic-based argument contends that municipalities
should be treated like states for antitrust purposes to maximize efficiency.2 82 Antitrust laws should maximize consumer welfare.2 8 3 Municipalities may act in one of four ways to affect competition: 2 4 1)
to promote competition; 2) to correct market defects; 28 5 3) to promote a value other than efficiency; 28 6 or 4) to generate monopoly
profits for city officials, private parties or the public treasury.
The first possibility does not create antitrust problems. The sec279. Easterbrook, supra note 233, at 45. "Competition among the states to
create attractive systems of economic regulation is greatest if states may adopt any
regulations they choose, at any level of government they choose, so long as the residents of the state that adopts the regulation also bear the whole monopoly overcharge." Id.
280. See infra note 285.
281. For discussion of discriminatory zoning techniques, see D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW

§§ 242-47 (1975); see

also Note, An Argument for an Antitrust Attack on Exclusionary Zoning, 50
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1035 (1984) (exclusionary zoning might constitute a group boy-

cott, a concerted refusal to deal, a horizontal market division or price-fixing).
282. Lopatka, supra note 129, at 54-74.
283. Id. at 54.
284. Id. at 55.
285. For example, a municipality may act to address the problem of "public
goods," which Lopatka describes as goods that are consumable by more than one
individual simultaneously and that individuals cannot be easily excluded from consuming. Id. at 57. Police protection, fireworks displays, and natural monopolies are
examples of public goods. Id. at 57-58.
286. Municipalities may act to redistribute wealth or to protect people from
their own mistakes. Id. at 61.
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ond possibility may increase consumer welfare. Therefore, antitrust
liability should not attach because courts are unequipped to secondguess the municipality as to whether a particular action increases

efficiency.2 87 If the third and fourth possibilities reduce consumer
welfare, they are best remedied through the political process. 88 This
option is not available when a private actor engages in anticompeti-

tive conduct. Furthermore, when the political system fails, 2 9
problems can be resolved by the state legislature or the federal commerce clause.

According to Professor Lopatka if the goal of antitrust law is to
maximize consumer welfare, imposing liability is inefficient for several reasons. First, antitrust analysis is a sophisticated, learned pro-

cess. Courts are bound to make errors in analysis and results as they
perfect the technique. 29 0 These errors have inherent economic costs.

Second, the specter of liability may so chill municipalities that they
fail to act to improve consumer welfare. Third, litigating antitrust
issues is notoriously expensive. Finally, immunity for municipalities
should be independent and not derivative from state authorization

because state authorization of individual municipal activities is expensive and
will adversely affect the municipalities' sense of
21
autonomy.
287. Lopatka notes:
About all a court could do is simply disagree with the decision and find
that the city misestimated the magnitude of the externalities. The city may
have, of course. . .. To allow an antitrust court to make this determination, though, is to allow it to perform a task it is not equipped to
accomplish.
Id. at 60.
288. The electorate may choose or reject inefficiency results. Additionally,
Lopatka does not regard the generation of monopoly profits for city officials-the
fourth possibility-as an antitrust problem, but rather as one to be resolved by state
laws governing fiduciary duties of public officials. Id. at 63. This argument is related to the "Tiebout Hypothesis," developed by Professor Charles Tiebout regarding suburban specialization. He postulates that consumers may "vote with their
feet" to select among municipalities offering different "packages" of goods and services, including better schools, more police protection, etc. Tiebout, A Pure Theory
of Local Expensatures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Consumers similarly could
select the municipality with their preferred mix of regulation and competition.
289. The political system fails when those who are unable to participate in the
decision making process are burdened most by inefficient results. Lopatka, supra
note 129, at 68.
290. Lopatka cites Boulder as an example of judicial reasoning gone astray in
that the goal and the effect of the cable television moratorium "was designed to and
did enhance efficiency. . . . Yet the district court entered a preliminary injunction
against the city, holding that the city's conduct 'in reasonable probability will be
declared unlawful under the antitrust laws.'" Lopatka, supra note 129, at 73 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1040
(D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)).
291. Id. at 73-76. This last argument is common. See Hovenkamp & MacK-
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Other advocates of immunity argue that municipal abuses of
power will be curbed by conflict of interest laws, sunshine laws, the
Freedom of Information Act, 29 2 section 1983 of the Civil Rights

Act,293 the commerce clause, 294 the first amendment, 295 and the fifth

and fourteenth amendments,29 6 in addition to political and demographic changes.

The argument for immunity is supported by analogy; judges are
granted immunity for judicial acts, legislators for legislative acts,
and various officials have qualified immunity for official acts. Thus,
municipalities should be granted immunity for municipal acts.297

Proponents of solutions to perceived problems inherent in the
Parker doctrine strive for a middle ground between total immunity
and rule of reason balancing. One solution grants municipalities immunity, except when they act in a commercial capacity.
Professor Deutsch advocates imposing antitrust liability when
local governments act as developers, partners of developers, or when

local officials engage in corruption, improper influence, or self-dealing.298 He advocates treble damage awards when an individual
erron, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
292. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Claims were made under both the antitrust
laws and the Civil Rights Act in Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983);
Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer & Standby Serv. v. Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Westborough Mail, Inc. v. City
of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983).
294. The commerce clause states: "Congress shall have the power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... ." U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
295. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
296.

The fifth amendment states: "No person .

.

. shall be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment, in pertinent part, states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1.

297. See GIVENs, ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

§

18.01 (1984);

"The problem of delegation is quintessentially a question of state law turned into a
federal question by confusing standards for governmental and private action authorized by the state. A commercial/non-commercial distinction makes more sense than

'authorization' issues"; see also Vanderstar, Liability of Muncipalities Under the
Antitrust Laws: Litigation Strategies, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1983):
"The [Supreme] Court has been reluctant to apply the antitrust laws to the conduct
of those who are not engaged in commercial activities."
298. Deutsch, supra note 172, at 86-87; see, e.g., Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d
646 (9th Cir. 1983); Cedar-Riverside Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp.
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abuses the public trust for private benefit, but only actual damages
when the local government acts as a developer. 9 The attempt to
find a middle-ground solution for determining immunity is unworkable because it relies on the governmental function analysis previously rejected by the Supreme Court.30 0 Moreover, in cases of corruption, self-dealing, or improper influence, adequate civil and
criminal safeguards and sanctions already exist. Thus, to resort to
the antitrust laws when individual government officials have acted
wrongfully is unnecessary.
Critics of immunity raise several arguments. First, Congress intentionally made no exceptions to the antitrust laws at the time of
their enactment. Therefore, Congress, not the judiciary, should de-

velop any exceptions.30 1 Second, if the public accepts the benefits of

their officials' anticompetitive behavior, it should bear the costs

when the behavior violates the law. 0 2 Finally, the rule of reason is as
effective in the municipal context as in the business arena. 30 3

In response, this author advocates that the source of immunity
should indeed be Congress, not the courts. The Local Government
1290 (D. Minn. 1978), affd on other grounds sub nom., Cedar-Riverside Assoc.,
Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979). Allegations of corruption,
improper influence, or self-dealing by officials were made in Whitworth v. Perkins,
559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Stauffer v. Town
of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) %64,029 (D. Colo. 1980); Brown v.
Carr, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,033 (D.D.C. 1979); Nelson v. Utah Co.,
1978-I Trade Cas. (CCH) %62,128 (D. Utah 1977).
299. In these cases, "private economic goals are being pursued by the public
entity, and being pursued inappropriately." Deutsch, supra note 172, at 87-88.
300. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985). Although this case presented a tenth amendment issue, Justice Blackmun's
opinion is relevant to immunity issues:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left
open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to
engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common wealth
* '*I[T]he States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic
experiment, if they must pay an added price when they meet the changing
needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a
different society left in private hands.
Id. at 546 (citing Newstate Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
301. Justice Stevens made this argument in his dissent in Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 66-80 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
302. This argument was made in Note, Municipal Antitrust, An Overview, 60
CHi-KENT L. REv. 349, 382 (1984).
303. Several authors support rule of reason analysis. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 302, at 373, which proposes a test under which the court will balance the pro
and anticompetitive effects of the regulation if the regulated area is appropriate for
competition.
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Antitrust Act 30 4 is a step in that direction. Congress has already limited liability in other contexts30 5 and should expand protection for
local governments by granting them total immunity, subject to specific, applicable limitations. Second, whether the public actively accepts or rejects the anticompetitive behavior of their local governments is questionable. Local legislatures have a duty to act in the
interest of public health, safety, and welfare. As previously discussed, some municipal decisions are inherently anticompetitive. The
public should not lose general revenue because the local governing
board made an apparently unwise decision.3 06 Finally, municipal decision making
is inherently different from that of the business
30 7
world.
Thus, the antitrust laws are not amenable to control of municipal conduct, as illustrated when they are applied to land use planning. 308 Anything short of total immunity retains many of the flaws
of the traditional state action rule. Even the Local Government Antitrust Act will not prevent courts from refusing summary judgment in
cases in which actual allegations of conspiracy are present. The time
and expense of litigation, albeit for injunctive relief only, are still
problematic. The Act does not relieve the state-local pull imposed by
the Supreme Court in its recent cases. 30 Municipalities derive little
protection under current state statutes that are not specific in their
authorization of activity. 310
This author also agrees with the arguments advanced by
Lopatka, 31' Easterbrook, 31 1 and other proponents of economic efficiency. To the extent that economic considerations are relevant in
the municipal context, a strong argument supports immunity on efficiency grounds.
Lastly, other existing limitations on governmental power provide
enough protection for private parties against the misconduct of municipal officials. Basic due process, equal protection, and other constitutional guaranties, as well as various statutory remedies are avail304. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. Il 1985).
305. See. e.g., id § 13(c) (exemption of nonprofit institutions from the price
discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patmon Act); id. § 17 (antitrust laws not
applicable to labor organization); id. § 45(a)(2) (permitting minimum or stipulated
prices for trademarked goods); id. § 638(d)(3) (aid to small business for research
and development not within prohibitions of antitrust laws).
306. See supra notes 129-30, 133-49 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
309. See Hovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 24.
310. See, e.g., the discussion of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40, supra notes 64-69 and
accompanying text.
311. Lopatka, supra note 129.
312. Easterbrook, supra note 233; see also Wiley, supra note 134.
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able to disgruntled plaintiffs.3 13 As Professor Areeda stated:
The most flagrant displacements of competition usually are
clearly authorized by the state and are thus immune from
the Sherman Act. Federal control must therefore take another form. Congress can preempt the state suppression of

competition through further regulation, or federal courts can
strike down a state law or enjoin an official action that unduly burdens interstate commerce, impinges on the first
314
amendment, or violates due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Local Government Antitrust Act, as enacted by Congress,
is a step in the right direction. However, the protection offered by
the Act does not go far enough. Congress should extend complete
antitrust immunity to local governments.
The activities of governmental units differ from those of private
businesses and cannot be evaluated under the antitrust laws in the
same manner. The impact of local legislation is frequently anticompetitive as applied to an individual, but actually benefits the community as a whole. This concern for the general welfare is the guiding
principle for municipal governing bodies. Antitrust litigation tends to
be complex, expensive, and time-consuming. It may have a chilling
effect on the local governing body. Also, adequate safeguards already exists outside of the antitrust laws. to protect individual citizens from improper government regulation. A grant of immunity
from Congress avoids supremacy clause problems, as well as some of
the ambiguity, line drawing, and separation of powers problems of a
judicially-created exemption.
Society and the role of local government has changed fundamentally since the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1913,
and the Parker doctrine of 1943. Today, municipal governments
often are required to provide more services, perform more functions,
and regulate more actively than in the past. A local government is
not a private business and should not be treated as such. Therefore,
Congress should recognize and remedy this problem.

313.
314.

See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
Areeda, supra note 156, at 454.
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APPENDIX A
15 U.S.C. § 34. Definitions applicable to Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1984 provisions
For purposes of this section and sections 35 and 36 of this title(1) the term "local government" means
(A) a city, county, parish, town, township, village, or
any other general function governmental unit established by State law, or
(B) a school district, sanitary district, or or any other
special function governmental unit established by
State law in one or more States,
(2) the term "person" has the meaning given it in subsection(a) of section 12 of this title, but does not include
any local government as defined in paragraph (1) of
this section, and
(3) the term "State" has the meaning given it in section
15g(2) of this title.
§ 35. Recovery of damages, etc., for antitrust violations fromany
local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official
capacity
(a) Prohibition in general
No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees
may be recovered under section 15, 15a, or 15c of this title
from any local government, or official or employee thereof
acting in an official capacity.
(b) Preconditions for attachment of prohibition; prima facie
evidence for nonapplication of prohibition
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to cases commenced before the effective date of this Act unless the defendant establishes and the court determines, in light of all
the circumstnces, including the state of litigation and the
availability of alternative relief under the Clayton Act,
that it would be inequitable not to apply this subsection to
a pending case. In consideration of this section, existence
of a jury verdict, district court judgment, or any stage of
litigation subsequent thereto, shall be deemed to be prima
facie evidence that subsection (a) of this section shall not
apply.
§ 36. Recovery of damages, etc., for antitrust violations onclaim
against person based on official action directed by local government,
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or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity
(a) Prohibition in general
No damages, interest on damages, costs or attorney's fees
may be recovered under section 15, 15a, or 15c of this title
in any claim against a person based on any official action
directed by local government, or official or employee
thereof acting in an official capacity.
(b)

Nonapplication of prohibition for cases commenced before
effective date of provisions
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply with respect
to cases commenced before the effective date of this Act.

